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This article reports on results so fir from ongoing empirical research into attitudes and
practices in New Zealand and Japan as to contract renegotiation in cases of extreme economic
dislocation. It reports primarily on a survey administered to students in both countries. It adds
some preliminary results from a more ambitious survey and follow-up interviews with
companies; final results will follow in early 1997. In the interim, the article draws some
possible implications for reform of the law of frustration of contract, and for legal theory more
generally.
I CONTRACT LAW IN ACTION
It has been said:1
The commercial character of contracts rests in many cases on the assumption that each of the
parties will play his part in the relationship in accord with the reasonable expectations of the
others. That is why parties to continuing supply contracts, where price and supply are the
subjects of written agreement, expect and usually receive a sympathetic response when the
cost of performing their obligations is affected by a sudden rise in prices of raw materials or by
a dramatic change in exchange rates. To the lawyer, the written contractual formula ends all
* Lecturer in Law, Victoria University of Wellington; Associate, JHJ Crawford Law Office. This
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1 G Barton "Whither Contract?" [1981] NZU 369, 373.
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argument; to the businessman, it merely provides the base for a further round of negotiation
in the sure faith that he will not be bound by the letter of the agreement.
New Zealand readers may well imagine that this quote encapsulates a peculiarly
Japanese attitude towards resolving contract disputes, and towards contract law itself.2 In
fact, it comes from a paper presented by Dr George Barton at a New Zealand Law
Conference in 1980. His views stemmed partly from his experience in advising some of New
Zealand's best known businesspeople.3 At the conference, however, Richard Craddock QC
was reported as being equally convinced that if New Zealand lawyers believe that the
"reasonableness" principle (advanced by Dr Barton) "is what the commercial community
wants, then 'we misread our market' ... the businessman expects performance and certainty,
and to lose the latter diminishes the likelihood of the former".4
One way to resolve such conflicting views is systematic empirical research. In the
United States, Stewart Macaulay's extensive interviews of Wisconsin businesses in the
early 1960s revealed a pattern closer to that suggested by Dr Barton.5 In the United
Kingdom, a study by Hugh Beale and Tony Dugdale of manufacturers in Bristol in the 1970s
led to similar conclusions.6 This provides a backdrop, still frequently overlooked, to
similar observations in somewhat less systematic studies by Japanese commentators in the
19605, translated into English in the early 19702 None of this research was referred to at
the New Zealand Law Conference in 1980.8 This is unsurprising, since New Zealand lacks
2 Foreign writers emphasising this sort of attitude among Japanese include eg, R March The
Japanese Negotiator: Stategy and Subtlety beyind Western Logic (Kodansha International, Tokyo,
1988), especially ch 6. New Zealanders may still have fewer fixed preconceptions than North
Americans, Europeans, or even Australians, due in part to fewer and differing historical
contacts with Japan see L Nottage "Contract Law and Practice in Japan: An Antipodean
Perspective" in H Baum (ed) japan: Economic Success and Legal System (de Gruyter, Berlin, 1996)
197.
3 Specifically, for instance, Sir Brian Todd, described by Lord Wilberforce in CIR v Europa Oil (NZ)
Ltd [1971] NZLR 641, 644 as "an adroit and effective [contract] negotiator".
4 [1981] NZU 379, 380.
5 S Macaulay "Non-Contractual Relations In Business: A Preliminary Study" (1963) 28 Am Soc
Rev 55.
6 H Beale and T Dugdale "Contracts between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual
Remedies" [1978] Brit J Law & Soc 45.
7 See T Kawashima "The Legal Consciousness of Contract in Japan" (1974) 7 Law in Japan 1; Y
Noda Introduction to Japanese Law (A Angelo, trans and ed, Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, 1976).
8 Personal communication from Dr Barton.
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a tradition of socio-legal inquiry.9 To begin filling this void, this article reports on results
from a survey organised from Japan, recently administered to both law and business
students in that country and to a more limited extent in New Zealand. As Part II explains,
this provides a useful starting point for ongoing empirical research into contract
expectations and practices of businesses in both countries, some of which is also reported
on in this article.
Macaulay's findings have profoundly influenced contract law teaching in the US.10
Primarily through "relational contract" theory, developed initially by Ian Macneil, they
have also underpinned major developments in contract law theory and legal theory
generally.11 The effect of this can be seen in case law and proposals for legislative reform.12
To a lesser extent, this has been also been so in the UK and in Japan.13 By contrast, the
effect on contract law teaching in New Zealand has been minimal.14 Yet practitioners and
judges are already grappling with the empirical background to contemporary contracting
9 Difficulties stemming from this are also highlighted in a preliminary comparison of civil litigation
trends in New Zealand and Japan: L Nottage and C Wollschlager "What Do Courts Do?" [1996]
NZU 369.
10 Particularly through the "Wisconsin school": see eg L Friedman Contract Law in America - A
Social and Economic Case Study (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison Wise, 1965); L Friedman
and S Macaulay "Contract Law and Contract Teaching: Past, Present, and Future" [1967] Wisc
L Rev 805; S Macaulay, J Kidwell, W Whitford and M Galanter Contracts: Law in Action (The
Michie Company, Charlottesville Va, 1995).
11 For example see I Macneil "The Many Futures of Contract" (1974) 60 So Cal L Rev 691; Goetz
and R Scott "Principles of Relational Contracts" (1983) 67 Virg L Rev 1089 (law and economics);
J Feinman "Relational Contract and Default Rules" (1993) 3 So Cal Interdisc U 43 (critical legal
studies); M Frug "Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract
Law" (1992) 140 U Pa L Rev 1029 (feminist jurisprudence); R Barnett "Conflicting Visions: A
Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational Theory of Contract" (1992) 78 Virg L Rev 1175
(contemporary liberalism).
12 N Crystal "An Empirical View of Relational Contracts under Article Two of the Uniform
Commercial Code" [1988] Ann Surv Am L 293; H Sono "UCC Dai Ni Hen (Hanbai) no Knisei Sagyo
ni miru Gendai Keiyaku Ho no Ichi-Doko [The Revision of UCC Article 2: PEB Study Group
Reports, Llewellyn's Rich Legacy, and Modern Contract Law] (1)" (1994) 44 Hokudai Hogaku
Ronshu 837.
13 See P Atiyah An Introduction to the Low of Contract (5 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995) 50-53; T
Uchida "The New Development of Contract Law and General Clauses - A Japanese
Perspective" in The Organizing Committee of the Symposium (ed) Proceedings of the
Symposium Japanese and Dutch Lows Compared (International Center for Comparative Law and
Politics, Tokyo, 1993) 119.
14 For a rare mention, see J Burrows, J Finn and S Todd Cheshire & Fifoot' s Law of Contract
(Butterworths, Wellington, 8th NZ ed, 1992), 26-27.
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and with relational contract theory.15 Parts III-V of this article therefore consider some of
the implications for New Zealand legal education of even the preliminary results from this
survey. Part VI then revisits a recently revived discussion paper on reforming the law of
frustration, which draws on empirical and comparative insights dovetailing quite neatly
with the preliminary results from this survey as well as some from the ongoing study. Part
VII concludes by sketching some implications for legal theory generally.
Even more so than Macaulay's pioneering research, this is a preliminary study. Results
of ongoing research will be reported more fully in early 1997, and theoretical points
developed further.16 This interim report aims to reveal some of the richness that
comparative empirical research can add to the rather austere landscape of contemporary
New Zealand contract law.
II THE KATO/YOUNG SURVEY: A BASIS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The Kato/Young survey was devised by the Research Center for International
Comparisons of Legal Consciousness, based at Nagoya University Law School, and an
interdisciplinary group of nine researchers from other Japanese universities.17 Five others
based overseas subsequently became affiliated with this project.18 The survey has already
been administered in ten countries.19 Tentative comparisons for some of those countries
were presented at an international conference in Tokyo in 1995, although further data
15 For instance, a version of relational contract theory was extensively argued in Pizza Restaurants
(NZ) Ltd v Pepsico Australia Pty Ltd (Unreported, CL 35/92, HC Auckland, Robertson J,
24/3/94).
16 In a special issue of the NZ Law Review (forthcoming, April 1997).
17 Directors of the Center are Professor Masanobu Kato (Nagoya University) and Professor
Michael Young (Columbia University). The former has also been instrumental in organising a
symposium comparing aspects of legal consciousness in East Asian societies, primarily between
Japan and Korea (subsequently reported in (1992) 1007 Juristo 12). The primary impetus for
that focus was a nation-wide survey into legal consciousness carried out in Korea in 1991 (see
Song (ed) 1996, reviewed by L Nottage (1996) 26 VUWLR 600, especially at 605-606). Kato has
also recently published an inquiry into another aspect of key interest to the Center, private
property ("A Perspective on the Structure of the Emergence of Property Right Conceptions"
(1995) 1069-78 Juristo). Two of the the nine other researchers based in Japan, contributing to
the Center's present research project into contract consciousness, are in fact Chinese, and one
is Korean.
18 They are academics from Columbia University, Humboldt University, Hanoi University, and
Victoria University of Wellington (this author); and a Thai jurist now in private practice.
19 Japan, China, Korea, Philippines, France, United States, Australia, Hong Kong, Thailand, and
New Zealand.
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collection outside Japan and more detailed comparisons are still underway.20 The final
results for Japan have recently been published in Japan's leading law journal.21 Some
partial results for New Zealand have also been collected.22 Some preliminary observations
can therefore be made and some directions outlined for further research, some of which is
already underway.
Multiple variants of the survey were administered in each country because respondent
"nationalism", or systematic bias towards certain other countries, was considered a distinct
possibility. For New Zealand, the organisers formulated six variants:
(i) Japanese buyer - New Zealand seller (of timber)
(ii) New Zealand buyer - Japanese seller (of ships)
(iii) New Zealand buyer - New Zealand seller (of oil products)
(iv) "Country A" buyer - "Country B" seller (of commodity X)
(v) New Zealand buyer - US seller (of oil products)
(vi) US buyer - New Zealand seller (of oil products)
All variants are based on the same scenario. Although seemingly not etched on the
collective consciousness in New Zealand to the degree it is in Australia, the scenario is
close to the "sugar case" dispute which flared up between a consortium of Japanese buyers
and a Queensland seller in the late 19709.23 Briefly, it postulates a long-term supply
contract concluded at a fixed price well below the then market price, followed by an even
greater fall in the market price which prompts the buyer to call for renegotiation. The
scenario is divided into four stages, interspersed with eight propositions (qA-qH) with
20 M Kato and A Fujimoto "An International Comparison of Contract Consciousness - Which is
More Unique, Japan or the US?" (1995) Paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the
Research Committee on Sociology of Law (International Sociological Association), "Legal
Culture: Encounters and Transformations" (Tokyo, 1-4 August 1995) Section Meetings
Supplement 3,39.
21 M Kato and M Young "Nihonjin no Keiyakukan [Conceptions of Contract held by Japanese]"
(1996) 1096 Juristo 44.
22 So far, the sample is much smaller - a total of 475: 362 from Victoria University, 114 from Massey
University, and 9 from Waikato University. (It is hoped that this preliminary report will
encourage colleagues at other New Zealand universities to administer the survey to their
students as well.) Data entry has also proven laborious, and only a total 01 168 (254 from Victoria
and 114 from Massey) have been entered so far. Some of those did not answer all questions:
hence the varying sample sizes used for the analysis summarised in Tables 1 to 3 below (at
III-V).
23 March, above n 2, 97-107.
64 (1997) 27 VUWLR
respect to which respondents are requested to indicate whether they strongly agree (by
circling 1 on the questionnaire form), agree (2), are uncertain (3), disagree (4), or strongly
disagree (5).24
(i) Buyer and seller conclude a five-year contract at a fixed price half that of the then
prevailing market price; but a year later the market price drops to a quarter of its
original price. The buyer, now locked into an expensive contract, and in poor shape
financially, attempts to renegotiate terms. The seller initially agrees to postpone
sales for one year. However, during that second year, the price drops further, to one
fifth of the original market price. The buyer then repeatedly attempts to renegotiate a
lower contract price; but, despite negotiations, the seller refuses.
qA. It is imprudent to conclude a contract for five years for the products, whose market
price fluctuates markedly.
qB. It is natural to alter the contract terms if the market price falls greatly, so it is
reasonable for the buyer to take the actions set out in (i).
qC. Despite the great fluctuation in market price, the seller's refusal to lower the contract
price demonstrates too inflexible an attitude.
(ii) At the start of the fourth year, the buyer decides to refuse to take delivery of the
goods.
qD. This action by the buyer should be supported.
(iii) The seller insists on shipping the goods, so they begin accumulating in the buyer's
port. After three months of this, towards the end of the fourth year, the seller agrees
to reduce the contract price by one tenth.
qE. These actions by the buyer should be not be supported because one should observe terms
once a contract is made.
qF. These actions by the buyer are ethically sordid.
qG. It is ridiculous for the seller to finally agree to reduce the contract price, despite the
originally fixed price.
(iv) It turns out that the buyer would have risked bankruptcy had it kept to the original
contract terms.
qH. Since contract terms cannot be kept upon bankruptcy, the buyer would inevitably take
all the above actions.
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Before outlining some significant results, three possible difficulties with the design of
this survey should be considered.25 First, at the international conference in August 1995,
questions were raised as to whether the sample of law and commerce students was
representative, and whether they could be good proxies for lawyers and businesspeople
respectively or for the commercial world generally. The organisers had considered
surveying lawyers and businesspeople directly, but ended up surveying students.
However, this is understandable. There would have been even greater practical
difficulties in administering the survey in so many countries, particularly given the minimum
sample size needed for each questionnare variant. Admittedly, students surveyed in Japan
tend to be from "good" universities. However they can be seen as representative at least of
the Japanese elite, and certainly of a significant force in Japanese legal and commercial
circles. The potential for students surveyed to be unrepresentative is also minimised in
countries like New Zealand, where all universities are state-funded. On the other hand, it
may be worthwhile to survey students doing commerce courses from a broader range of
tertiary institutions, such as polytechnics. Finally, preliminary results to versions (iii) and
(i) of the Kato/Young hypothetical included in a survey currently being administered to
New Zealand and Japanese firms are revealing a similar pattern to that obtained from
combined law and commerce student respondents in each country.
A second, more difficult question is whether the scenario is overly abstract. Macaulay's
initial research, and even more so his later work,26 demonstrated the value of in-depth
exploration of organisations and markets in relatively distinct areas of activity, to generate
a better feel for the complex way in which norms in contracting situations can be played
out.27 Further, specifically with regard to both social and legal responses to extreme
24 The scenario and questions are not reproduced verbatim, because multiple survey variants
were used. However, despite some infelicities in expression, the wording in the ensuing text
above is as close as possible to that used in the student surveys. A further set of survey questions
were included to compare respondents' attitudes towards authority and power, building on
earlier work by Adorno. Preliminary data for New Zealand has not yet been fully analysed, but
results from Japan suggest the need for closer analysis of the way respondents develop attitudes
and expectations as a particular dispute unfolds (A Fujimoto "Keiyaku Sonjundo to Kenryoku Shiko
[The Extent to which Contracts are Adhered to, and Orientation towards Authority]" (1996)
1096 Juristo 64). This accords with insights from relational contract theory (Macneil above n 11),
some feminist theory (Frug above n 11), and neo-proceduralism (below n 155). It also reinforces
the importance of follow-up interviews in the further study currently underway.
25 Cf V Taylor "Nihonjin no Keiyakuishiki - Australia kara no Kansatsu [Contracts Consciousness of
the Japanese: Observations from Australia]" (1996) 1096 Juristo 71.
26 Eg S Macaulay "Private Legislation and the Duty to Read - Business Run by IBM Machine, the
Law of Contracts, and Credit Cards" (1966) 19 Vand L Rev 1051.
27 S Moore "Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Field as an Appropriate Subject of
Study" [1973] Law and Society Review 719. In this sense, Macaulay anticipated the current
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economic dislocation affecting contractual relations, Macaulay and others have asked: "do
the rules change when the game gets bigger?".28 The US cases they review strongly suggest
that they do. An example is the way in which Westinghouse Electric Corporation staved off
potential bankruptcy in the late 19709 and early 19809, from power company claims
aggregating US$2.6 billion regarding supply of uranium fuel for nuclear power plants
constructed by Westinghouse.29 Other case studies, such as the US government's bailout of
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in 1971, also show vividly how legal norms are played out
in complicated political and social arenas.30
In present survey variants, the hypothetical contract amount is large, and the potential
bankruptcy of the buyer is revealed at stage (iv). However, as Veronica Taylor has pointed
out, the present survey abstracts factors like details of the business relationship between
the two parties, their absolute size and relative position within the industry, and their
experience in international transactions.31 Another key factor in the Sugar Case, as in many
major US cases, was its highly political nature. The Queensland supplier, CSR Ltd, was
controlled by the Queensland state government. The dispute became a bilateral trade issue
and, when the goods started to back up in Tokyo Bay, the Japanese government became
actively involved. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries developed new legislation to
rationalise the sugar refining industry in Japan. The Ministry also exercised administrative
guidance over the buyers, in the search for a rational solution to the problem.32 On the other
"interpretive" turn in legal sociology, for which see Y Wada, Hoshakaigaku no Kaitai to Saisei -
Postmodern o koete [The Deconstruction and Rebirth of Legal Sociology: Beyond Postmodernism]
(Kobundo, Tokyo, 1996).
28 Above n 11, 681-770.
29 S Ota and M Young "Keiyaku Kankyo no Hendo to Keiyaku Sonjun - Jirei Kenkyu o chushin ni
[Adherence to the Contract and Changes in the Contracting Environment: Focusing on Case
Study Research]" (1996) 1096 Juristo 41, note some parallels between the Westinghouse litigation
and the survey hypothetical based on the Sugar Case. However, one important difference in
the former was the innovative approach of the trial judge. On two occasions, Judge Merhige
found that Westinghouse was not excused, but pressed the parties to settle and eventually
limited the remedy so that there was some loss-sharing. The Court of Appeals then did excuse
Westinghouse, but used its equitable powers to fashion a result it saw as fair. Not surprisingly,
many of the other Westinghouse suits settled. Another important consideration was the highly
regulated nature of the industry at the time, and hence the political sensitivity of the suits.
Macaulay et al, above n 10, 742-770.
30 Macaulay et al, above n 10, 669-678.
31 Above n 25, 72.
32 See March, above n 23. Such "guidance" is supposed to be of no coercive effect, and to leave
the regulated parties the option of voluntarily.refusing to comply; but at least in the 1970s, it
was still highly persuasive. See M Young "Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance:
Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan" (1984) 84 Col L Rev 924.
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hand, some abstraction is inevitable in any survey research. Further, student respondents
did not tend to mechanically circle "3", indicating "uncertainty", which could be interpreted
as a plea for more detail in order to be able to respond to each proposition more
definitely.33
A third question is whether the hypothetical scenario is realistic, in that the
hypothetical contract does not contain any clauses providing for economic dislocation and
adjustment of the contractual relationship. Taylor suggests that contracts used by Japanese
parties have changed considerably, and concludes that the Sugar Case may now be merely of
historical interest.34
There will always be a tension between contracting parties who still deliberately
speculate on market movements by agreeing simply on a fixed price even over a lengthy term,
and others who agree on that without sufficient deliberation. In some industries, deliberate
speculation on an agreed fixed price may be more common, or the parties may carefully draft
clauses to allow for some risk sharing or contract adjustment.35 Further, drafting practice
within those industries can change in line with structural changes in markets.36 Thus,
issues of contract renegotiation should certainly be related to both legal possibilities and
Although US commentators have tended to see administrative guidance as uniquely Japanese,
it is certainly not unknown in the US. A good example is US government "jawboning" during
the Vietnam War in the late 1960s, putting pressure on its suppliers and subcontractors to
accord military orders priority over civilian contracts. In Eastern Airlines Inc v McDonnell Douglas
Corp 532 F 2nd 957 (5th Cir, 1976), such jawboning was held to excuse McDonnell's delays in
supplying aircraft to Eastern. In the English tradition, "guidance" is also not unknown, but is
often circumvented by detailed statutory provisions. Even then, however, disputes can arise
(see, in the context of judicial review, R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Lancashire
County Council [1994] 4 All ER 165)
33 By contrast, that has been a noticeable tendency in responses so far from a similar hypothetical
put to Japanese firms. Follow-up interviews of some of those firms may reveal what is driving
that tendency.
34 Above, n 25, 71-2. Further, as one New Zealand company respondent has observed, the
hypothetical also seems unrealistic in implying that the seller has shipped goods - especially in
version (i) involving timber - to the buyer's port, before having had a Letter of Credit opened
in its favour. This aspect of the Sugar Case itself, and possible changes in practice, deserve
further investigation.
35 See eg the survey of interuational oil traders by L Trakman The Law Merchant: The Evolution of
Commercial Low (Fred B Rlithman, Littleton Colorado, 1983) ch 8. See also the strict approach
taken by the Californian Court of Appeals towards an oil supplier's force majeure clause in
Nissho Iwai Co Ltd v Occidental Crude Sales Inc 729 F 2d 1530 (1984).
36 See eg the study of iron ore export contracts by T Daintith "The Design and Performance of
Long-Term Contracts" in T Daintith and G Teubner (eds) Contract and Organisation (de Gruyter,
Berlin, 1986) 164.
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actual practices in contract drafting:37 the latter also deserve empirical research. Again,
however, this is an aspect which can be less readily incorporated into a survey of students.
A further survey has therefore been devised and partially implemented, addressing these
difficulties while building on the Kato/Young survey. First, it is aimed at over 110 firms in
New Zealand and over 60 firms in Japan. Secondly, the survey requests follow-up
interviews, some of which have already been undertaken. They allow responses to be
explained, and a richer picture of particular institutional structures to emerge. Thirdly, the
survey includes a part on contract planning and drafting practices actually undertaken by
respondent firms, based on a recent survey of US firms.38 As mentioned, the results of this
research will be reported in early 1997.39 However, the Kato/Young survey, and some
interesting results summarised below, have already proved useful in formulating hypotheses
and advancing this more ambitious project.
III NEW ZEALAND AND IAPAN COMPARED
A first interesting result to emerge from the Kato/Young survey is that even New
Zealand students are not too "tough" on the buyer who tries to renegotiate the deal. This is
surprising for two reasons. First, the fact that the deal was originally struck at a price
highly favourable to the buyer might dispose respondents to think that the buyer should just
have to live with it.40 Secondly, one might have expected students to be aware that New
Zealand law provides little comfort to the buyer in this sort of situation, as Part VI below
shows. A second interesting result is the similarity between responses from students in New
Zealand and Japan.
Table 1: New Zealand vs Japan
qA qB qC qD qE qF qG qH
37 This point also emerges in the structure and findings of Macaulay's pioneering study (above n
5).
38 R Weintraub "A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy" (1992) Wise L Rev 1.
39 Above n 16.
40 This attitude is exemplified by one company's comment on this hypothetical: "The key here is
that the deal was hugely favourable to A [the buyer] when struck. The quid pro quo is surely
that there are ups and downs; A here is aiming for the best of both worlds". Some commentators
in Japan made the same criticism of the Japanese importers during the Sugar Case dispute
(Kobayashi, "Tokule Chi'kai Osutororia [Australia: So Near and Yet so Far]", quoted in S Tanaka
and M Ueno Keiyakuishiki to Bunsho Hyogen [Contract Consciousness and Written Expression]
(Nunoi, Tokyo, 1980) 177-179. Yet such views are not so strongly held by New Zealand and
Japanese student respondents.
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NZ 2.23 3.0 3.04 3.39 2.47 2.79 3.61 2.48
(297)
Japan 2.26 2.90 2.85 3.33 2.70 3.04 3.58 2.42
(2855)
Student respondents in both countries generally agree that it is imprudent to enter into
this sort of fixed term contract (qA). There is some ambiguity regarding qA. Some
respondents strongly disagreed with this proposition (circling "5"). Comments so far from
surveys and at follow-up interviews of companies (albeit larger New Zealand companies)
suggest that these respondents thought it could still be acceptable to commit to a long-term
contract, provided careful risk analysis was first undertaken and/or that variable pricing
(such as indexation) was agreed on in the contract. In their other responses, these
respondents tended to be quite consistently critical of the buyer in this hypothetical, and
correspondingly supportive of the seller trying to enforce the original deal. On the other
hand, as just noted, the majority tended to think that contracting for a lengthy fixed term
remained "imprudent". Since it becomes immediately apparent - from stage (i) of the scenario
- that it is the buyer who has got into difficulties, this response can also be interpreted as
criticism directed primarily towards the buyer. Thus, perhaps responses to qA are best
interpreted merely as indicative of the willingness to enter into long-term contracts
generally, and hence of long-term or short-term attitudes towards business dealings.41
Responses to subsequent questions are therefore likely to be more revealing as to attitudes
towards contract renegotiation per se.
Indeed, student respondents in both countries become uncertain about whether it might
be "natural" to alter the terms if the market price falls greatly (qB), as requested by the
buyer. Certainly, there is no strong implicit criticism of the buyer. Respondents are also
uncertain about whether the seller may have been too inflexible in refusing to reduce that
request (qC). Compared to their Japanese counterparts, NZ respondents do become
marginally more critical of the buyer when the latter then threatens not to take delivery
(qD). Further, when the goods have begun to accumulate in the harbour, they tend to agree
that allowing the buyer to carry out this threat should not be condoned, both on legal
principle - sanctity of contract (qE) - and, to a lesser extent, on ethical grounds (qF).
These appear to be two key questions, because they most clearly set out general principles
41 Responses so far from companies show that New Zealand companies are significantly more
likely to agree that entering into five-year contracts is "imprudent", compared to Japanese
companies. Responses to a further question added to the company survey also show that they
are considerably less likely to actually enter into contracts of more than one year, at least
domestically.
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for consideration. Thus, perhaps the most striking result is that even NZ responses to qE
and qF are not more critical of the buyer.
On the other hand, New Zealand respondents seem even readier to accept that the seller
would have had to give in to the request for price reduction at this stage (qG). Respondents
also tend to accept that a risk of bankruptcy to the buyer justifies the latter's actions (qH).
This may indicate some tenderness towards the buyer, although certain comments from
company respondents indicate that this attitude may be born more of necessity.42
Overall, law and commerce students in both New Zealand and Japan do not appear to
feel too strongly one way or the other. They are perhaps slightly more critical of the buyer.
However, as described more fully in Part VI below, this attitude differs quite markedly from
that of the courts in both countries, particularly in New Zealand.
Also striking are the similarities between New Zealand and Japanese responses.
Responses to qA, qB, qD, qG and qH are virtually identical. Japanese respondents are
marginally more likely to see the seller as too inflexible when initially refusing the buyer's
request for a lower price (qC), and are subsequently more lenient towards the buyer both as
a matter of legal principle and on ethical grounds (qE, qF); but those differences are not
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Further, the different trends for law as
opposed to business students, and for female as opposed to male students, are broadly
similar in both countries. Those trends will be reviewed in Parts IV and V below.
First, however, an aspect emerging only from the survey as administered in New Zealand
should be addressed, namely surveys of international students attending New Zealand law
and business schools. The question of country bias, where some differences between Japan
and New Zealand have become apparent, will also be considered. In both respects,
however, further research is needed before any definite conclusions can be drawn.
A Internationalising Legal Education
One interesting characteristic of the survey of students in New Zealand was the high
number of respondents with other than New Zealand nationality. Consistently with the
methodology in other countries where the survey was implemented, results from the latter
subset were excluded from the sample in deriving the results reproduced in other sections of
this article. However, a comparison with results from respondents of New Zealand
nationality reveals only one statistical difference (the latter disapproved more of the
buyer's refusal to accept the goods, in qD).
42 One very large New Zealand food products suppliers was "uncertain" in connection with qG,
noting that "B [the seller] had to weigh up relative risks and rewards"; and "agreed" with qH,
noting that "survival is an imperative for most companies"!
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Some of the "other nationality" respondents came from countries where preliminary
results suggest quite different views overall.43 One explanation for this finding may be that
these respondents "cancel each other out". It remains to systematically compare final results
from those countries. Another explanation is that these respondents quickly come to share
the norms of their counterparts of New Zealand nationality. Although the rapidity of the
assimilation implied by this explanation seems unlikely, there may be some parallels with
findings suggesting that foreign companies readily adapt to the legal culture of their host
country.44 The latter aspect is currently being pursued in further surveys and follow-up
interviews of companies in both Japan and New Zealand, which include some subsidiaries
of companies incorporated in the other country. Whether or not a rapid assimilation
process can be substantiated among foreign students in New Zealand is also an important
pedagogical issue.
B Country Bias: Nationalism vs Transnational Intersubjectivity?
Kato and Young report that there was little country bias among combined law and
business students in Japan.45 Surveys were administered in Japan involving seven foreign
countries as the country of first the buyer, and then the seller. Each contained eight
questions (as above). Hence there was a total of fifty-six cases in which statistically
significant country bias could have been found, because Japanese responses to each of the
eight questions could have differed significantly depending on whether the buyer was from
one of the seven foreign countries, rather than Japan. In fact, there was only significant
country bias in nine cases. Further, in at least six of those nine cases, Japanese respondents
were morefavourably disposed towards the foreign country than towards Japan.46 Nor did
the statistically significant differences congregate in responses to certain foreign countries.
The only two countries to receive significantly biased treatment for two questions were
France and Korea; all others (China, the US, England, Germany and Australia) received
such treatment for only one question. Anyway, that bias was favourable in in both cases
for France and in one of the two cases for Korea. In other words, what little country bias
there was suggested that Japanese respondents were anti-nationalistic in orientation.
43 Eg mainland China: Fujimoto and Kato, above n 20.
44 Y Matsumura "Attitudes of Canadian Subsidiaries of Japanese Firms Towards the Law and the
Legal System in Canada" (1987) 21 UBC L Rev 209.
45 M Kato and M Young "Nihonjin no Kakkoku Imeji to Kei'yakufunso [Contract Disputes and
Japanese Images of Various Countries]" (1996) 1096 Juristo 60.
46 Kato and Young (above n 45, 61, 63) interpret as nationalistic a lower overall score for qA in the
case of Japanese as opposed to a Korean buyers because they see it as a reluctance to enter into
long-term contracts with the latter. However, an alternative interpretation is that this is greater
implied criticism of Japanese buyers (text above at n 41).
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In terms of each question, only four (qA, qC, qD and qF) revealed statistically significant
differences in responses from Japanese law and business students combined. Exceptionally,
they did exhibit clearly nationalistic orientation with regard to qD: they were significantly
more likely to criticise the buyer for threatening to refuse delivery where the buyer was
American or British, compared to where the buyer was Japanese. Kato & Young suggest that
this may be a reaction to trade friction, particularly gaiatsit (foreign pressure) from the
US.47 However, overall, Japanese respondents are not significantly biased against the US
with regard to any other question, so this hypothesis remains to be further substantiated.
Indeed, in the other situations where country bias was statistically significant, Japanese
respondents were tougher when the buyer was Japanese (qH and possibly qA) or more
lenient on seller which was foreign (qC). Kato & Young again suggest how some of these
responses may be related to contemporary Japanese foreign policy. For instance, they
suggest that one reason why Japanese respondents are initially significantly more lenient
towards intransigent Korean sellers, and correspondingly less understanding of
intransigent Japanese sellers (qC), is a sense in Japan that Japan has the greater obligation
to come to the negotiating table when resolving disputes with Korea, as part of making
amends for colonising Korea. A similar sense of shame might explain why Japanese
respondents are significantly less likely to criticise on ethical grounds Korean buyers who
ultimately refused shipment (qF).48 However, such a direct link between foreign policy or
general attitudes in Japan and responses to a contracting scenario seems overly ambitious. It
also does not explain well why, when the Korean buyer's threat to refuse delivery is still
only a threat (qD), Japanese business students - if not law students - nonetheless object to
such behaviour more so than when the buyer is Japanese.
An alternative explanation for systematic differences with regard to particular
countries may be that Japanese respondents have strong impressions of ethical norms and
legal principles prevailing in those countries, and adjust their responses accordingly. Thus,
Japanese law students may be influenced by some general impression that Korean social and
legal norms require a seller in this situation to come to the negotiating table (hence the
difference in qC) and that, more so than in Japan, ethical norms are more amenable to a
buyer refusing delivery and precipitating a renegotiation in extreme cases (hence qF). That
may also explain why business students can turn nationalistic (qD): they probably receive
less training than law students, in Japan as in New Zealand, in putting themselves in the
other side's shoes in this way. This may also explain why business students are
consistently more nationalistic, whereas law students are consistently anti-nationalistic.
47 Above n 45,62.
48 Above n 45, 61, 63.
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When the survey results from various countries like Korea have been fully collated, it
will be interesting to see the extent to which perceptions of Japanese students are in fact
accurate. But such deliberate intersubjectivity in a transnational context, in attempting to
respond to this sort of questionnaire, would demonstrate an impressive internationalism.
On the other hand, the fact that so few statistical differences have emerged, and the lack of
opportunity for follow-up interviews, makes it difficult to substantiate the extent to which
this is in fact prevalent in Japanese universities.
New Zealand respondents tended to demonstrate more statistically significant country
bias. Further, when they did, it tended to be nationalistic - more critical of a foreign buyer
- and directed much more towards Japanese than US buyers. Apparently, this is also the
attitude emerging in US responses.49 Further, this country bias among New Zealand
respondents was more pronounced among law students. That was also true in Japanese
responses, but there the attitude of law students was quite strongly anti-nationalistic. It
may be that New Zealand law students are less intersubjective in approach. They may be
unaware of, or less willing to guess what might be, the relevant socio-legal norms in Japan
(which a number might be expected to think favoured renegotiation); even those that did take
that step might have been reluctant to adapt their responses to such norms. On the other
hand, this preliminary analysis must be treated with similar caution, especially as the
sample has been much smaller than for Japan.
IV LAW AND BUSINESS STUDENTS: LEARNING TO MANIPULATE
THE LAWF
New Zealand responses were also remarkably similar to Japanese responses in that
New Zealand business students tended to be tougher on the seller (abstracting from the issue
of the latter's nationality), compared to law students. Table 2 shows that business students
were significantly more critical of the buyer who had refused to take delivery, on both legal
and ethical principle (qE and qF respectively), and disagreed less with the seller's eventual
agreement to lower the contract price (qG). Similar significant differences were found when
comparing Japanese business and law students.50
49 Above n 45,62.
50 Mean values for those questions were, respectively, 2.8 for law students versus 2.55 for business
students; 3.13 versus 2.88; and 3.13 versus 3.32. In Japan, but not in NZ, business students were
also significantly more likely to find it "imprudent" to enter into a 5-year fixed term contract, in
response to qA (2.35 versus 2.12). The mean scores in New Zealand responses to this question
admittedly went against this pattern (2.17 versus 2.28); but the difference was not statistically
significant anyway. The only counter example in Japan was to qD, where law students were
more likely to disagree with the buyer's threat not to accept delivery (3.37 versus 3.27). Kato
and Young (above n 21, 51) suggest that this may simply be related to non-acceptance being
used as a "textbook" example of breach of contract in Japanese contract law courses.
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Table 2: New Zealand Law vs Business Students
qA qB qC qD qE * qF * qG * qH
Law 2.17 2.95 2.95 3.34 2.59 3.01 3.77 2.53
(158)
Business 2.29 3.06 3.15 3.44 2.34 2.53 3.43 2.42
(139)
* Indicates that difference statistically significant at the 95% Confidence Level
Intriguingly, in Japan, this toughness on the part of business students, or - put
differently - the relative leniency of law students, was highly correlated to legal
education. Almost invariably, business students who had attended some law courses were
significantly less tough towards the buyer. Law students surveyed also tended to become
more lenient as they "advanced" through law school. Kato and Young suggest that this
pattern may be due to legal education teaching students, especially advanced law students,
that the law can be "manipulated".51 That may be particularly so in Japan, which has a
strong realist tradition in private law.52
However, even New Zealand law students nowadays probably come away from law
school with a degree of cynicism as to the extent to which legal rules are routinely
determinant of dispute outcomes, a tendency which may grow as they enter legal practice.53
Yet there was no pattern of more advanced New Zealand law students becoming more
lenient on the buyer in this situation. On the other hand, law students as a whole do remain
more sympathetic to the buyer. At least compared to business students, with much less legal
training (if at all), perhaps they do see the law as manipulable to a degree. Such a finding
raises difficult questions regarding what law schools and a career in the law should aspire
to.
There is an alternative explanation with less challenging implications. Although the
questionnaire is formulated in terms of expectations or what should be done, rather than
51 Above n 21.
52 G Rahn Rechtsdenken und Rechtsau#assung in Japan [Legal Thought and Conceptions of Law in
Japan] (CH Beck, Munich, 1990) 139-147, 202-264. But also a positivist counter-tendency: L
Nottage "Japanese Contract Law, Theory and Practice: 'Plus qa change, plus c'est la m@me
chose?"' in V Taylor (ed) Asian Law through Australian Eyes (LBC, Sydney, forthcoming 1997).
53 See eg J Flood "Doing Business: The Management of Uncertainty in Lawyers' Work" (1991) 25
Law & Soc Rev 41 in the US, and A Felstiner & W Sarat, Divorce Lawyers and Their Clients (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1995) for the US; J Morison and P Leith The Ban'ister's World and the
Nature of Imu (Open University Press, Buckingham, 1992) in the UK.
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what the law says must be done, it is conceivable (especially in the context of qE, for
instance) that students' understanding of the relevant legal principles may significantly
influence their expectations. Thus, it may be that students simply fail to understand or
remember the relevant legal principles. Perhaps New Zealand students never got to the end
of the standard textbook to learn that frustration of purpose excusing the buyer is extremely
rare under New Zealand law (see Part VI below). Japanese students are more likely to come
across the doctrine of changed circumstances at an earlier stage of their contract law
course, but may remain unaware that it is rarely successfully invoked in Japanese courts
(see Part VI below). Perhaps New Zealand students do not appreciate that their law relies
on formal reasoning that puts great stress on the parties' initial agreement and leaves little
role for direct consideration of extraneous, more substantive factors (see Part VII below).
If so, however, one would expect more advanced students to become tougher on buyers in
this situation, especially in New Zealand law schools with their proliferation of elective
courses which increasingly draw on and review disparate areas of law. Yet that is belied
by the results in both countries. It will be interesting to test students in contract law courses
in New Zealand and Japan using a problem modelled on the questionnaire scenario, after
spending a similar amount of class time reviewing the relevant legal principles. But one
suspects that results would be largely unchanged, due to students in both countries still
seeing those legal principles either as casting only a weak "shadow" over the ultimate
outcome even in a legal context,54 or as largely irrelevant to what should be the outcome in
this sort of scenario. Such tendencies would lead back to the need for careful
reconsideration of the goals of contemporary legal education and professional ethics.
V MEN AND WOMEN: AN ETHIC OF CARE?
A further thought-provoking similarity between results in Japan and New Zealand is
that, quite consistently, men are more likely than women to be tougher on the buyer. Table 3
shows that New Zealand men are significantly more likely to disagree with the proposition
that the seller was too inflexible in initially refusing to lower the contract price (qC), and
that they are more likely to object to the buyer's subsequent refusal to take delivery, both on
legal principle and ethical grounds (qE and qF). Similar significant differences were found
when comparing Japanese men and women students, although there that pattern extended to
responses to all eight questions.55
54 R Mnookin and L Kornhauser "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce"
(1979) 88 Yale U 1149.
55 Kato & Young, above n 21.
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Table 3: New Zealand Women us Men
qA qB qC * qD qE * qF * qG qH
Women 2.25 2.93 2.95 3.33 2.55 2.93 3.66 2.55
(167)
Men 2.26 3.08 3.20 3.50 2.32 2.60 3.58 2.41
(161)
* Indicates that statistically significant at the 95% Confidence Level
Particularly in regard to questions like qC and qF, more clearly asking respondents
solely what they think is ethically correct, these differences appear consistent with the
"different voice" or "ethic of care" uncovered by Carol Gilligan from her interviews of US
women in the 1970s. One test used by Gilligan involved questions regarding the reasons for
interviewee responses to a psychological test, "Heinz's dilemma" - should a man steal a
drug which he cannot afford to buy, in order to save the life of his wife56 Although more
dramatic, this "impossible" situation is rather similar to the hypothetical scenario used in
the Kato survey. Further, differing responses to questions like qC and qF bear some
parallels to the way in which Gilligan's two interviewees, Jake and Amy, conceive of the
moral problem in very different terms:57
Jake [as] a conflict between life and property that can be resolved by logical deduction, Amy a
fracture of human relationship that must be mended by its own thread.
Even at stage (i) of the scenario, New Zealand women begin to favour the buyer, finding
the seller's attitude too inflexible (qC). By stage (iii), when the buyer refuses to accept the
goods which begin backing up in the harbour, the buyer becomes subject to some mild
criticism, but distinctly less than the criticism from New Zealand men (qF). Perhaps this
stems from a sense that the seller is still not working hard enough to resolve the buyer's
difficulties, but that the buyer also shares the blame by adopting such a tough negotiating
stragegy rather than talking matters through. Gilligan's findings mainly came from extensive
interviewing. Some of the follow-up interviews of New Zealand companies, in particular,
may provide an opportunity to get a better sense of what drives women's responses towards
contract renegotiation.
More theoretically, Beverley Brown is cautious about stressing the relational "voice"
uncovered by Gilligan, and about attempts to directly incorporate relational considerations
56 C Gilligan In a D(ferent Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge Mass, 1993 reprint), 25-6.
57 Above n 56, 31.
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into contemporary contract law.58 This highlights a further potential difficulty in simply
importing social norms and practices into contract law, considered briefly in Part VII
below. On the other hand, Mary Joe Frug's post-modern proposal to simultaneously accept
and disrupt difference and boundaries highlights the potential instability of New Zealand
law's sharp delineation of excuse from strict liability (reviewed in Part VI below).59
For those more interested in legal education in this country, the implications from the
tentative results of the present survey are also important. Responses to qE show that New
Zealand female students are significantly less likely to criticise the buyer by invoking a
strict view of contractual liability. New Zealand courts (see Part VI C below), and law
teachers who follow the English tradition of defering to the courts, are more likely to
follow the stricter view adopted by male students. This creates the potential for female
students to be systematically disadvantaged, compared to male students, should they be
examined on questions like those posed in this survey.
Law teachers in the US have long raised doubts as to whether some cases and materials
used in contract law classes, and they way they are handled, give appropriate messages to
women students.60 These survey results raise further questions as to how perspectives of
New Zealand women might best be given their due in contract law courses.60a
VI REFORMING THE LAW ON FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT
In 1982, John Burrows presented a paper on reforming New Zealand's law of
frustration to the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, one of several part-
time law reform committees whose advisory role to the government was superseded by the
Law Commission in 1986. The paper was included as an Appendix to the Law
Commission's recent Contract Statutes Review.61 His overview of arguments for and against
reform in this area, and those passages emphasised in some of the quotations below, point to
the need for empirical research along the lines suggested in this article. The results from the
58 "Contracting Out/Contracting In: Some Feminist Considerations" in A Bottomley (ed) Feminist
Perspectives on the Foundation Subjects of Law (London, Cavendish, 1996) 5.
59 Above n 56, 1046-7.
60 M Frug "Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook" (1985) 34 Am U L
Rev 1066.
60a Such issues are being broached by some contract law teachers such as Nan Seuffert at the
University of Waikato (personal communication). She is currently exploring extensive resources
developed iii Australia, publically available 01, the Internet
(http://online.anu.edu.au/law/pub/teaching_material/citizen/ContractLaw.html).
61 Report No 25 (Wellington, 1993) 275-306.
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Kato/Young survey, as well as the further survey being administered to companies, already
dovetail well with some of his specific observations.
Generally, Burrows advocates serious consideration of reform allowing greater relief
to a party whose contract has become very onerous due to extreme changes in circumstances.
He outlines some of the possible arguments both for and against reform in that direction. His
first general point is that the common law tradition is still dominated by the view of
contract expressed in Larrinaga & Co u Societe Franco-Americaine·M
No one can tell how long a spell of commercial depression may last; no suspense can be more
harassing than the vagaries of foreign exchanges, but contracts are made for the purpose of
fixing the incidence of such risks in advance, and their occurrence only makes it the more
necessary to uphold a contract and not to make them the ground for discharging it.
Yet, Burrows says, "it should be pointed out that this is not a necessary view. It is not
held in other systems - in Japan, for example".63 In fact, modern Japanese contract law has
tended to share the rather strict view of contractual obligation epitomised by the Larrinaga
case. This is unsurprising, given its origins in Continental civil codes and legal scholarship
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. However, such an "aleatory" view of contract law,
premised on self-responsibility and "formal contract justice", has been subjected to
increasing criticism in Japan since at least the 1970s.64 Allan Farnsworth has noted a
similar tradition in some areas of US contract law.65 Likewise, Atiyah cites the decision of
the House of Lords in Davis Contractors v Fareham UDC,66 a frustration case where Lord
Radcliffe adopted what Dr Barton would view as the "reasonableness" principle, as a
milestone in the gradual decline in the ideology of freedom of contract in English law from
1870 to 1980. Thus, Burrows is in good company in putting in broader perspective the
classical English approach to discharge by frustration.
He also quite rightly criticises as misleading the test that subsequently emerged in cases
like Davis v Fareham, namely whether performance has become "totally different" from that
contracted for. Instead he suggests that another important consideration is whether the risk
62 (1923) 29 Com Cas 1, 18. Burrows, above n 61, 284.
63 Above n 61, 284.
64 K Yamamoto "The Aleatory View of Contract and Critical Contract Theory in Japan"
Proceedings of the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Research Committee on Sociology of Law,
"Legal Culture: Encounters and Transformations" (Tokyo, 1-4 August 1995), Section Meetings
Supplement 2, 143, 143-150.
65 E A Farnsworth "Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements" (1987) 87 Colum L Rev
217,220.
66 [1956] AC 696. P Atiyah, above n 13, 21.
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of the disruptive event should be borne by one or the other of the parties. Factors listed as
relevant to determining the latter also deserve careful consideration: custom in particular
types of contract, whether one party is better placed to anticipate and guard against the
risks, and whether one party should be taken to have voluntary assumed them.67
Burrows' second general point deals with the argument that reformulating the doctrine
of frustration to allow greater scope for relief may "induce laxness at the outset in
negotiating and pricing contracts, and in their drafting". He notes:68
how real this fear is, is difficult to say. If there is merit in such a view, it may simply be ati
argument for saying that any power to grant relief should be sparingly exercised, rather than
, that the power should not exist at all.
His third point deals with the argument that any relaxation of the doctrine willlead to a
lack of certainty. He notes:69
The notion Of certainty in contract, insofar as it means anything more than that a contract fixes in
advance the risk of changes in circumstances, has been little analysed. Even under present law,
contracts are so much at the mercy of circumstance that it is difficult to say that one can
predict with certainty the course of their performance or the profit one will make at the end
of them. Fancied notions of'certainty' meant nothing to the builder in Davis u Fare}lam.
Finally, Burrows summarises the general argument in favour of changing the present
law:70
the present law can cause great injustice. In many cases sharing the loss caused by the
external events would have been more satisfactory thatn allowing it to lie entirely on one
party. An even stronger argument is that not all businesspeople would agree with the hard-and-fast
rule of the coninion !aw. It is not uncommon for parties to enter into major deals in the basis of 'letters
of intent' or the vaguest oral understandings, leaving matters to be sorted out reasonably if and when
difficulties arise during performance.
Burrows concludes this general discussion by quoting the extract from Dr Barton's
conference paper set out at the start of this article, noting that if the latter is correct the law
might well be reformed so as to better accord with the expectations of its subjects. As that
quotation and the passages emphasised in this Part show, the area is ripe for empirical
research into New Zealanders' expectations. Further, many of Burrows' views as to how
67
68
69
70
Above n 61, 284.
Above n 61, 286 (emphasis added).
Above n 61, 286 (emphasis added).
Above n 61, 286 (emphasis added, citation omitted).
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the doctrine could be reformed are supported by the preliminary results of this survey as
well as some patterns emerging from ongoing empirical research.
A Duty to Negotiate
One solution Burrows puts forward for consideration, "although it is difficult to see
how it could be enforced, other than by making it a precondition to other forms of relief, is a
statutory obligation on parties whose contract has been seriously affected by changes in
circumstance to attempt to negotiate a satisfactory modification of their contract". Burrows
goes on to suggest that "no doubt this happens now between reasonable parties".71 He
concludes:72
In Japan this practice has apparently become the norm [two sources omitted]. In that country
a contract may be rescinded if a change of circumstance (such as a currency change) has
made further performance of the contract unconscionable or contrary to good faith. But
notice must be given of rescission and the practice has developed of the promisor proposing a
modified contract before exercising the option to rescind. Citizens of common law countries
trading with Japanese interests no doubt find this procedure a little unusual but, because of
the difficult of enforcing strict performance against someone resident abroad, they normally
comply and get around the negotiating table.
1 Promisor's Duty to Negotiate: Giving Notice and Proposing Variations
Thus, it seems that the content of a duty to negotiate mooted by Burrows involves at
least a requirement that notice be given. It may also involve a further obligation on the
promisor (claiming frustration) to propose some variation to the contract in light of the new
circumstances. The latter would usually subsume the former. Either, however, would be
counter to the traditional English (and New Zealand) view that frustration "brings the
contract to an end forthwith, without more and automatically".73 Elsewhere, Burrows has
criticised this anomalous rule, noting that "it is not a logical necessity that impossibility of
performance should operate to discharge a contract. In many Continental systems it is
71 Above n 61,291. However, here Burrows notes potential difficulties in enforcing such
renegotiated agreements because of the "pre-existing duty rule" in Anglo-New Zealand law.
Recently, Williams v Ro#ey Bros & Nicholls (Constructors) Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1 has begun to eat away
at one aspect of that rule. However, it has been criticised by New Zealand commentators (B
Coote, "Consideration and Benefit in Fact and in Law" (1990) 3 JCL 23) and has not been
expanded on by New Zealand courts (see L Nottage, above n 2, 200-201 at fn 8). And see now J
O'Sullivan "In Defence of Foakes u Beef' (1996) 55 CLJ 219, arguing that the approach adopted
by Williams should not be allowed to undermine the rule in Foakes u Beere (1884) 9 App Cas 605.
72 Above n 61, 291-292.
73 Hirji Mulji u Cheong Yue SS Co [1926] AC 497, 505 (per Lord Sumner). See also the decision of the
Court of Appeal in Power Co Ltd v Gore District Council (Unreported, 4/11/96, CA 267/95) 29-31.
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viewed rather as a defence ... . Indeed, this sort of approach is characteristic of both US
law and the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG"), in
force in this country since 1 October 1995, and it leads more naturally to a minimal
requirement of notice.75 It is also characteristic of Japanese contract law, which has been
heavily influenced by the Continental or civil law tradition, as will shortly be shown. It is
important, however, to separate out the two aspects Burrows has conflated in the passage
reproduced above: legal norms, and the social norms or practices in Japan.
First, as explained by the latter source cited by Burrows, Japanese law provides for two
separate doctrines relieving a promisor from performance due to subsequent extreme events:
non-attributable impossibility, and the doctrine of changed circumstances Uijo henko no
gensokit).76 The former is older, stemming from both specific provisions in the Civil Code
(promulgated in 1898), and the civil law methodology (mainly German) which was
subsequently adopted to make the provisions operate effectively. A starting point is article
415, which provides that the promisor shall be liable for damages for failing to perform in
accordance with the tenor and purport of the obligation, or where performance becomes
impossible for any cause attributable to the promisor. By negative implication, the latter has
been interpreted to mean that the promisor is not liable where performance becomes
impossible for any cause not attributable to the promisor. Non-attributibility clearly covers
acts of God. It soon came to include cases of legal impossibility.77 By the Second World
War, it was being extended to cases of impossibility viewed with "the ordinary good sense
of society".78 Initially, however, there was a reluctance to extend this doctrine to cases
where performance simply became more economically burdensome - what is termed
"impracticability" in some common law jurisdictions.79 This interpretation was later
74 Above n 14, 642 (citation omitted).
75 E A Farnsworth Contracts (Little Brown, Boston, 1990) 729-30; UCC §2-615(c). B Nicholas "Force
Majeure and Frustration" (1979) 27 AJCL 231; Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) Act
1994, s 2, Schedule, Article 79(1), (3) and (5); Article 79(4). This conceptual structure also leads
to better resolution of problems of partial/temporary impossibility, a problem not directly
addressed by this research and outside the scope of this article. See, generally, Burrows above n
61, 292-294; G H Treitel Frustration and Force Majeure (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994), ch 4.
76 K Igarashi and L V Rieke "Impossibility and Frustration in Sales Contracts" (1967) 42 Wash L Rev
445.
77 See eg Igarashi v Igarashi 26 Minroku 435 (1920) (seller not liable when goods intended to be
produced in its plant could not be delivered on time due to an injunction being granted over
the plant).
78 See eg Goto v Shibuya 4655 Horitsu Shimbun 13 (1941) (seller of oil excused because of vessel
inavailability during wartime).
79 Cf Ueda v Matsuda 10 D M Roku 1358 (1904) (disallowing rescission).
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relaxed somewhat.80 However, although a pattern of relatively liberal relief is discernable,
the caselaw is sparse.81 This doctrine still does not tend to be applied to cases such as
extreme cost escalation in construction contracts, or extreme increases in the market price of
the subject matter of the contract (such as land) subsequent to contract formation.82 Instead,
such cases have been subsumed by the doctrine of changed circumstances.
Before outlining that doctrine, the effects of the Japanese doctrine of non-imputable
impossibility should be explored. As mentioned above, Burrows states that first "notice
must be given of rescission" by the promisor. Although he is probably refering to the
doctrine of changed circumstances, that may well be the situation under the doctrine of non-
imputable impossibility as well.83 Certainly, it seems that the promisor should give notice to
avoid possible liability for breach of collateral contract duties (Aizui gimu).84 These duties
are underpinned by the principle of good faith and trust (shingi seijutst, no gensoh,) set out
80 T Sawada Subsequent Conduct and Supervening Events (University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1968),
122-123.
81 Above n 76,447.
82 H Kubo "A Comparative Study of the Basic Concept of Impossibility under Japanese, American
and Uniform Law" [1991] Sandai Hogaku 567, 576. Further, in a survey of 32 Japanese
companies carried out in 1966, T Sawada (above n 80, 212) noted relatively few disputes where
impossibility became an issue: "Destruction of the subject matter or legal prohibition are
uncommon. Iii the strict sense of the word, impossibility is almost unknown in the sale of goods.
Legally, parties in certain cases could have claimed impossibility relying on the theory that the
performance becomes impossible when the common sense of business so labels it. Yet even
under those circumstances many prefer working out adjustments rather than claiming
discharge."
83 Article 543 of the Civil Code allows immediate termination, but only by the promisee for
impossibility attributable to the promisor. It does not necessarily follow that a blameless promisor
can also terminate the contract immediately, ie without notice. Indeed, if the promisor does not
perform due to non-attributable impossibility, the promisee is also likely to be delayed in
performance. In that case, Article 541 does allow the promisor to terminate the contract, but
only upon after a reasonable period.
84 T Sawada, above, n 80, 131 (citing a discussion and example given by Hatoyama). Kitagawa
(Minpo Koyo (2) - Sail(en Soron [Lectures on the Civil Code II: Law of Obligations - General
Part] (Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1993) 16 explains that collateral duties derive from primary duties of
performance (ky•fu gimu), and thus argues that generally the promisee does not obtain an
obligation-right (saiken) to claim performance of collateral duties (ie including specific
performance). Breach of collateral duties may give the promisee the right to claim damages.
However this does not follow as simply as for breaches of primary duties of performance; there
can be considerable remedial flexibility for breaches of collateral duties (Z Kitagawa Minpo Koyo
(3) - Saiken Soron [Lectures on the Civil Code III: Law of Obligations - Particular Part]
(Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1993) 86).
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in article 1(2) of the Civil Code.85 On the other hand, the doctrine of non-imputable
impossibility does not specifically provide for the further step mooted by Burrows, namely
the promisor proposing some variation of the contract.86
The doctrine of changed circumstances was developed somewhat later, largely by
Masaaki Katsumoto's classic text published in 1926. Building on the ancient civil law
notion of clausula rebits sic stantibus, and German legal theory and case law after the First
World War, Katsumoto saw the new doctrine as a concrete expression of the principle of
good faith.87 It promised relief for a broad range of supervening changed circumstances,
including impracticability of performance, provided they were sufficiently substantial.
Other orthodox requirements of the doctrine are that the change was not and could not
reasonably be foreseen; that it was not attributable to the parties themselves; and that the
enforcing or maintaining the original obligations would significantly violate the principles
of good faith and fairness (usually, a significant disequilibrium between the respective
obligations and no default or objectionable conduct by the party seeking relief).88 The
economic and social dislocations of the Second World War and its aftermath saw the
doctrine come of age.
The remedies or effects provided by the new doctrine also went further than the doctrine
of non-imputable impossibility. The primary remedy was to be adjustment of the contractual
obligations; termination was to be secondary. Katsumoto proposed that the party seeking
relief first demand adjustment from the other, and only terminate the contract if this request
for renegotiation was denied.89 Obviously, if promisors must and do first seek renegotiation
of the contract, before being able to terminate the contract, then Burrows' statement that
"notice must be given of recission" is, under this doctrine, imprecise but not incorrect.90
85 The principle of good faith and trust, providing authority for imposing collateral duties, was
added to the Code in 1947. However it had been recognised in prior case law and academic
theory, drawing on French and especially German law. For a comparative view of its contours,
see L Nottage "Form and Substance in US, English, New Zealand and Japanese Law: A
Framework for Better Comparisons in the Law of Unfair Contracts" (1996) 26 VUWLR 247.
86 Nevertheless, like other civil law systems, Japanese contract law has no equivalent of the pre-
existing duty rule, and thus finds it much easier to enforce contractual variations. See Nottage,
above n 71.
87 T Sawada, above n 80, 133-4. P Waer "Frustration of Contracts in Japanese Law: The Doctrine of
Changed Circumstances" (1983 20 Law in Japan 187, 189-90. See also R Zimmermann "Heard
melodies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter ..." (1993) 193 AcP 121.
88 Waer, above n 87, 191-201.
89 Above n 80, 136-137.
90 However, Sawada (above n 80, 138-139) has criticised some Japanese courts for treating the
promisor's mere prior refusal to perform as equivalent to a request for renegotiation.
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However, he then states that "the practice has developed of the promisor proposing a
modified contract before exercising the option to rescind". Proposing a modified contract is
certainly consistent with the doctrine's traditional requirement that renegotiation first be
sought; only then does the promisor have a clear "option" to rescind. But, perhaps influenced
by a case study mentioned in the second source cited for his abovementioned statement
Burrows now seems to have switched focus, to current practice in Japan. This latter aspect
can now be separately considered.
In fact, a 1994 study of the 64 cases then reported where the doctrine of changed
circumstances was raised, revealed that in at least 28 cases the promisor had claimed only
recission, without first having claimed adjustment.91 In some of those 28 cases, the promisor
may well have first served notice on the promisee; but this pattern suggests that Japanese
practices at least regarding proposals to vary contracts may not be as clearcut as Burrows
believed, even when circumstances have changed considerably.
Of course, this data relates only to what was formally claimed in court, rather than
what was sought out of court. It is unwise to generalise as to actual practices from reported
cases, which are very much "the tip of the iceberg". Moreover, contract adjustment (alone)
was sought in 20 cases, and first contract adjustment and otherwise termination in 13
others. Quite regular calls for contract adjustment also emerge from Sawada's surveys and
interviews of some 40 Japanese companies as to actual disputes (subsequently litigated only
very rarely) which might have been covered by either doctrine. Such calls were made in at
least three of the four cases sketched by Sawada, where the doctrine of changed
circumstances might have applied.92 Further, Sawada found that many contracts included a
provision requiring such notice. Such provisions may have reflected pre-existing practices.
Admittedly, Sawada's research dates back to 1966. As mentioned, many believe that
Japanese practices have changed and are changing significantly.93 Yet survey research
currently underway into contemporary practices of Japanese companies - admittedly
mainly those with experience in contracting with overseas parties (viz New Zealand
companies) - already suggests that while some are careful in planning for contingencies in
long-term contracts, they still quite regularly receive requests for and themselves demand
adjustment of the contract. In this respect, results so far are not too dissimilar to those of
New Zealand companies contracting with Japanese counterparts - or, for that matter, to
91 K Iilima "lijo henko no Koka to shite no Keiyaku no Tekigo to Kaijo [Rescission and Adjustment of
Contracts as Effects of the Doctrine of Changed Circumstances]" (1994) 35 Toritsudai Hogakkai
Zasshi 127.
92 Above n 80, 217-22.
93 Above n 34.
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those of US companies generally.94 Further, although neither this survey of companies nor
the present survey of students in both New Zealand and Japan included questions aimed
specifically at clarifying practices and expectations as to timely notice-giving, the latter
seems likely to be a widespread requirement. It is frequently to be found, especially in
international contracts.95 Thus, further research into both notice-giving and proposals for
renegotiation, by the promisor, seems likely to reinforce the points made more generally by
Burrows in this regard.
2 Promisee's Duty to Renegotiate: In Good Faith
Further, responses to qC in the survey of students in both countries help to shed some
light on an issue related to those raised by Burrows. This relates to what is or can be
expected of the promisee in a renegotiation process triggered by extreme changes of
circumstances. Japanese responses to qC indicate at least mild criticism of the seller's initial
refusal to lower the agreed contract price - there was a slight tendency to see that attitude
as too inflexible. This was in spite of the hypothetical seller having already demonstrated
some flexibility, by acceding to the buyer's request to delay supplies at the agreed contract
price. Thus, the attitude expected of the seller (the promisee) would seem to support those
who have proposed a duty to renegotiate on the parties, ie including a duty on the pronisor.
In Japan, Zentaro Kitagawa first mooted this possibility in 1974, again as a collateral
duty underpinned by the duty of good faith.96 In 1987, Hiroyuki Kubo took this suggestion a
little further, arguing that to prevent an unscrupulous promisee unduly dragging matters out
by invoking this duty, it should be imposed on the promisor only after the court had
investigated whether the doctrine of changed circumstances could apply, and decided that
there was a real possibility that it could.97 In 1989, drawing predominantly on German law
and legal theory, Yamamoto argued that a duty to reIlegotiate is implicit in the remedies
provided by the doctrine of changed circumstances, and is consistent with a possibly much
94 Weintraub, above n 38, 18, 22.
95 See eg J Honnold Unlform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention
(Kluwer, Deventer/Boston, 2nd ed, 1990) 431; M Furmston "Drafting of Force Majeure Clauses"
in E McKendrick (ed) Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract 21 (Lloyds, London, 1991), 24-25.
96 Z Kitagawa "Fukakoryoku Menseki [Excuse through Act of God] II" (1974) 21/2 JCA Journal 8.
97 H Kubo, reprinted in Keizai Hendo to Keiyaku Riron [Contract Theory and Economic Change]
(Seibundo, Tokyo, 1992) 244-245. Kubo also suggested that a collateral duty to renegotiate should
only be imposed if there had been a "substantial" change of circumstancps. However, it is not
clear whether this means that the threshold should be higher than the traditional threshold for
the doctrine of changed circumstances, which has a similar requirement anyway.
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broader range of duties to renegotiate under contemporary Japanese contract law.98 More
recently, Takashi Uchida has suggested that the doctrine of changed circumstances aims
primarily to encourage good faith negotiations. He has also identified a number of lower
court decisions in other contract law areas where a duty to renegotiate was actually
imposed.99 On the other hand, the case authority is sparse, and it remains to be seen what
long-term impact these theories will have on the future path of Japanese contract law.100
By contrast, New Zealand remains firmly within the English law tradition. As already
mentioned, the conventional view that frustration automatically terminates the contract
leaves no room for a duty on the promisor even to notify the promisee, or to propose a
variation to the contract, let alone a duty on the promisee to enter into renegotiations in
good faith. Nor can New Zealand courts or commentators comfortably turn to a generalised
duty of good faith, as a stepping stone for pulling together a broader range of duties to
renegotiate, because the traditional view has been that there is no such generalised duty of
good faith.101 Even if a geizeralised duty of good faith were to emerge, a further problem will
be whether a duty to renegotiate can quickly become accepted under that rubric.102 These
difficulties are compounded by doubts as to whether even duties to renegotiate agreed on in
98 K Yamamoto "Keiyaku Kosho Kankei no Hoteki Kozo ni tsuite no Ichi Kosatsu [Some Observations on
the Legal Structure of Contract Renegotiation Relations]" (1989) 102 Minsho Ho Zasshi 808, 815-
816. Drawing inspiration from German sources, he relies primarily on N Horn
"Neuverhandlungspflicht [The Duty to Renegotiate]" [1981] AcP 181, 276ff. See also N Horn
"Changes in Circumstances and the Revision of Contracts in Some European Laws and in
International Law" in N Horn (ed) Adaptation and Renegotiation of Contracts in International Trade
and Finance (Kluwer, Boston/Deventer, 1985) 22-23.
99 T Uchida "Gendai Keiyakuho no Aratana Tenkai to Ippan Joko [New Developments in
Contemporary Contract Law, and General Clauses] (3)" (1993) 516 NBL 25. Cf Kubo, above n
97, 253. Originally published in 1991, the latter book chapter looks at Japanese contract law
doctrines that can be seen as "bordering" on the doctrine of changed circumstances, in an
attempt to determine some more general common features and hence future directions.
However, a duty to renegotiate is not mentioned.
100 Cf Nottage, above n 51, suggesting that the strong formal streak in Japanese contract law is still
powerful and likely to impede their rapid acceptance. But see now K Yamamoto "Saikoshiron ni
tsuite - Koshoriron to Keiyaku Riron no Kosaku [Renegotiation: The Interface of Negotiation
Theory and Contract Law Theory]" (1996) 63/1 Hosei Kenkyu 1, currently revisiting Horn's
theories both in more detail and in broader context.
101 Nottage above n 85,264-266.
102 The experience in this regard even of Germany and Japan, legal systems with a long tradition of
refining a generalised duty of good faith, suggests that the process will be a drawn out and
contentious one. Cf also S O'Byrne "Good Faith in Contractual Performance: Recent
Developments" (1995) 74 Canadian Bar Rev 70, who identifies an incipient generalised duty of
good faith in Canadian contract law, but does not include any suggestion of a duty to
renegotiate in her categorisation of the case law.
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a concluded contract are legally enforceable under English or New Zealand law, or
whether they are instead too uncertain.103
Article 7(1) of CISG provides "that regard is to be had to ... the need to ... promote the
observance of good faith in international trade". However, this only applies to "the
interpretation of [the] Convention"; good faith is not expressly made a distinct obligation of
contracting parties. This peculiar wording represents an unhappy compromise between
those supporting the latter approach, and those opposed to including a notion of "good
faith" on the ground that it would simply lead to uncertainty.104 Commentators are still
divided, and national courts are also likely to diverge, in their interpretations of the scope
of article 7(1).105 However, it seems that no commentator or court has yet been so bold as to
propose a duty to renegotiate based on this article. This is not too surprising, given the
tentative nature of the duty even in German and Japanese law, with comparatively long
experience in defining and refining the contours of a generalised duty of good faith.
A sign of things to come may be the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts. These were developed a decade later than CISG, and with less need for the last-
minute compromises which characterise multilateral treaty ngotiation. Parties may adopt
the Principles to govern their contractual relationship, and adjudicators may refer to them
in deciding disputes.106 The latter has already occured in at least one major arbitration in
New Zealand.107 Article 1.7 imposes an overriding duty of "good faith and fair dealing in
103 Doubts arise because of the hostility of English courts towards "agreements to agree" in a pre-
contractual setting. See eg E McKendrick, "The Regulation of Long Term Contracts in English
Law" in J Beatson and D Friedmann (eds) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Late (1995) 305,321.
This is particularly worrying given that a number of NZ companies already surveyed indicated
that they include renegotiation clauses in both domestic contracts and contracts with Japanese
parties for a term of over one year. It is questionable, for instance, whether the following clause
used by one large food products manufacturer could be enforced:
"[X] and [Y] are to mutually agree on the sales price of the Products. The sales price will be open
to review and mutual negotiation during the term of this Agreement should current market
conditions and costs of raw materials, manufacturing and transportation substantially change."
104 Honnold, above n 75; Law Commission, Report No 23 (Wellington, 1992) 35-6.
105 See eg F Enderlein and D Maskow International Sales Law. United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods - Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of
Goods: Commentary (Oceana, New York, 1992) 54-56. See generally L Nottage "Trade Law
Harmonisation in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Realist's View from New Zealand - and a Way
Forward?" [1995] NZU 295.
106 See generally M Bonell An International Restatement of Contract Low: The UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (Transnational Juris Publications, Irvington NY, 1994) 120-152.
107 D Williams "The Further Development of International Commercial Arbitration through
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts" (1996) 2 NZBLQ 7, 17-21.
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international trade" directly on the parties. Article 2.15 specifically covers bad faith at the
contract formation stage, whereas article 5.3 requires each party "to co-operate with the
other party when such co-operation may be reasonably be expected for the performance of
that party's obligations". These provisions seem more likely than CISG to lead to a duty to
renegotiate on the promisee, should the promisor invoke force majeure under article 7.1.7,
even though such a duty is not expressly set out therein. Such a duty seems all the more
likely when the promisor invokes "hardship" as defined in article 6.2, which explicitly
entitles the "disadvantaged party ... to request renegotiations",108
Thus, this brief discursus into Japanese law and developments in international trade
law suggests that New Zealand lawmakers may need to begin considering a perhaps more
radical notion than that proposed by Burrows: a duty to negotiate imposed on the promisee,
in extreme changes in circumstances.109
B Court Variation and Release
A second possible avenue for reform put forward by Burrows for consideration can
now be more shortly dealt with. Rather than automatic total discharge following a finding
of frustration, the traditional English and New Zealand law approach, the courts might
have: 110
power to grant just relief in the form of variation or cancellation of particular terms;
performance with compensation by one party; or total discharge on conditions. This would
move the court's discretion in the direction suggested by Denning LJ in his well-known
judgment in British Mouietonews Ltd u London & District Cinemas Ltd [1951] 1 KB 190; [1952] AC
166 (which was later disapproved in the House of Lords).
Burrows then considers arguments against such remedial flexibility. Foremost is the
concern that any attempt to reform the law in this way would lead to total destruction of
certainty in contractual relationships. Secondly, it could detrimentally affect insurance. A
seemingly related argument is that this will require judges to become economists: able to
calculate the effect of their decisions not only on the parties, but also the long term effects on
108 The wording is in terms of a request, rather than a right to insist on renegotiations; but that
seems unlikely to slow a court whose domestic legal system recognises some mandatory degree
of mandatory renegotiation. See generally D Maskow "Hardship and Force Majeure" (1992) 40
1992 AJCL 657, who however does not refer to this issue either.
109 Cf also the discussion on relevant US law as applied to certain international disputes in S
Burton "Combining Conciliation with Arbitration in International Commercial Disputes" (1995)
18 Hast Int & Comp L Rev 637, especially 647-650.
110 Above n 61, 288-89.
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contracts of that type and on commercial practices.111 Against this, it should be noted that
since Burrows' paper was initially prepared over a decade ago, one of New Zealand's most
senior judges has consistently called on the legal profession to meet this challenge, and some
are now seem to be meeting this challenge.112 Similarly, a final argument envisaged by
Burrows a decade ago, that many statutory reforms in New Zealand providing fairly wide-
ranging discretions to the courts first need "a chance to bed down and be thoroughly tested"
can now be met by Law Commission's recent review of those statutes, which showed that on
the whole they have not created great problems.113
Indeed, as Burrows argued, it is not a major step to allow judicial interference on
grounds such as harshness, after conclusion of the contract, when it is already allowed at
the time of contracting (as under the Minors' Contracts Act 1969). Burrows also points to
the close parallels between the law of frustration and that relating to common mistake,
where the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 already provides for discretionary relief. 114
Another argument is that total automatic discharge is a very blunt instrument, softened still
only quite unsatisfactorily by the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1944, and that a
discretionary power would permit less extreme solutions better attuned to what is required
in particular contractual relationships.115 Finally, and importantly for present purposes,
Burrows again turns to contract practice, arguing that:116
Some [standard form New Zealand] building contracts ... allow a very wide power to the
supervising engineer to vary the contract during the course of performance. What is here
being suggested would lead to no more uncertainty than this.
Of course, this assumes that judges will be able to apply standards to resolve such
problems as consistently as experts in the trade. This leads back to the question raised
earlier as to the proper role of. and the training for, the modern judiciary. Interestingly,
Schmitthoff also considers contract practices, as to "hardship" and "third-party intevener"
111 Above n 61, 289-90.
112 The calls have been made especially by the current President of the Court of Appeal, Sir Ivor
Richardson (see J Smillie "Formalism, Fairness and Efficiency: Civil Adjudication in New
Zealand" [1996] NZ L Rev 254). An example of them being met, at least in part, is the formation
of the NZ Law and Economics Association (http:/ /www.liinz.org.nz/liinz/other/leanz/).
113 Above n 61, 290.
114 Above n 61, 290. This is regularly pointed out in US law: Farnsworth, above n 75, 727-9; Kull
"Mistake, Frustration and the Windfall Principle of Contract Damages" (1991) 43 Hastings U 1,
115 Above n 61, 290, 295-306 (on difficulties with the Act: see also J Carter and G Holhurst "Gigs N'
Restitution - Frustration and the Statutory Adjustment of Payments and Expenses" (1996) 10
JCL 264.
116 Above n 61, 291.
-
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clauses and their operation especially in long-term international contracts, in proposing
reform of English law to allow for adjustment by the courts.117 This also implies
considerable confidence in the judiciary to develop consistent standards, just as other third
parties (eg experts and arbitrators in specific industries) and sometimes the parties
themselves (eg through trade associations).
Again, Burrows refers to Continental jurisdictions, to bolster the possible case for a
court power to adjust the contract. He refers to both German and French law, noting
however that in the former case the power is not exercised lightly, and that in the latter it is
limited to public contracts of a non-speculative type.118 A similar reluctance is evident in
Japanese law. Of the 64 reported cases which deal with the doctrine of changed
circumstances (mentioned at Part VI B above) adjustment alone was claimed in only 20 cases
and recognised in only 9 of them; adjustment or otherwise termination was claimed in 13
other cases, but adjustment was approved in only 4 of them.119
On the other hand, as even the US experience shows, the possibility of court adjustment
of the contract seems to welcomed by businesspeople in some situations. In Russell
Weintraub's recent survey,119a US companies were asked what should be done in the
following situation:
Company A has contracted to sell B a fixed quantity of fuel oil per month at a fixed price for
10 years. An unprecedented OPEC oil embargo causes the cost of the oil to A to far exceed
the price that B has agreed to pay. A's loss over the 10 years of the contract would be so large
as to require liquidation of A. B can pass on the added cost of oil to its customers without
suffering a competitive disadvantage. A refuses to deliver the oil at the contract price, and B
sues A for the difference between the contract price of the oil and the much higher price
that B must pay to obtain oil from other sources.
One might expect respondents to be more lenient than for the Kato/Young survey
hypothetical. There is no indication that supplier A initially obtained an exceptionally
good deal, which might lead respondents to hold A to its bargain. This is also a situation
117 C Schmitthoff "Hardship and Intervener Clauses" [1980] JBL 82.
118 Above 11 61, 289. See generally Horn, above n 98; and P Legrand "The Case for Judicial Revision
of Contracts in French Law" (1989) 34 McGill L Rev 909.
119 Above n 91. Termination was allowed in four others.
119a Above n 38.
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where the supplier is seeking to be excused, rather than the buyer, who runs some risk of
being treated less leniently.120 The results are nonetheless quite surprising.
Only 35% thought that B should receive a judgment for the difference between the
contract price and the market price. Almost 14% thought A should be excused and, perhaps
most intriguingly, 46% thought that "the contract price should be adjusted to avoid ruinous
loss to A, but to give B a significant savings over current market price".121 Weintraub notes
that the much publicised ALCOA case remains a rare example of a US court adjusting a
contract in similar circumstances, but also that the judgment and the general possibility of
court adjustment may better encourage a renegotiation and settlement process.122 Survey
responses from US companies may indicate support for this view.
Responses so far to the same question put to Japanese companies indicate a rather
similar pattern. Only around 20% would award B expectation interest damages, but only
8% would simply excuse A; around 64% favoured court adjustment.123 Although, as
mentioned, the latter remedy is rarely invoked by Japanese courts, the fact that it is more
readily available under Japanese law suggests that the law is more consistent with what
Japanese businesses expect of it, compared to the situation in the US.
The same cannot be said of New Zealand, where the gap between legal rules and
businesspeople's expectations seems even greater than in the US. Responses so far to the
same question put to New Zealand companies again reveal a rather similar pattern. They
are perhaps less lenient: around 39% would award B expectation interest damages whereas
less than 9% would excuse A. However, around 52% favour court adjustment in the
circumstances, even though this remedy remains unavailable under the traditional law of
120 For instance, Posner J in Northern Indiana Public Service Co v Carbon County Coal Co 799 F 2d 265
(1986) treated the buyer's claim as one of frustration of purpose, and went on to disallow it.
Treitel (above n 74, 283-4) convincingly argues that this is misconceived because the buyer
simply seemed to be claiming that the goods had become too expensive (effectively a claim of
commercial impracticability), not that they had become useless. On the whole, though, buyers
(or recipients of goods or services) appear to have more scope for arguing frustration of purpose
compared to suppliers, while such claims tend to be treated more strictly by the courts (Treitel,
above n 74,60).
121 Weintraub, above n 38, 41. (The discrepancy of 5% is from those who responded "other".)
122 Aluminium Company of America v Essex Group Inc 499 F Supp 53 (1980). Weintraub, above n 38,
42-43. See also R Buxbaum "Modification and Adaptation of Contracts: American Legal
Developments" in N Horn (ed) above n 98,45. Kubo (above n 97, 162-163) also observes that the
ALCOA case has not led to more contract adjustment by other US courts; but this seems to miss
the point about the different shadow cast on renegotiation processes simply by having this
remedy potentially available. See also Macaulay et al, above n 10, 731-734.
123 The discrepancy of 8% is from those who responded "Other".
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frustration. Of course, if New Zealand companies also favour this remedy as a means of
encouraging renegotiation, other means are conceivable. One is for courts to bend the rules
applicable to damages or other remedies ostensibly granted to B (the promisee), as occurred
in the Westinghouse litigation.124 However, no New Zealand companies have proposed this
alternative in response to the abovementioned scenario. If New Zealand lawmakers do
wish to defer to the expectations revealed by this survey question (a point raised in Part
VII), then these preliminary results reinforce the recommendation of Burrows and others
that contract adjustment should be available as a remedy for frustration, even if a residual
remedy to be exercised only sparingly.125
Again, although this possibility is not spelled out in article 79 of CISG, it is to be found
in article 6.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles, which provide that if the parties cannot reach
agreement within a reasonable time:
If the court finds hardship it may, if reasonable,
(a) terminate the contract at a date and on terms to be fixed; or
(b) adapt the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium.
Burrows concludes that if a judicial discretion is to be granted, formulating the
conditions in which the discretion can be exercised is of crucial importance.126 The
suggested formulation differs somewhat from that contained in both CISG and the
UNIDROIT Principles. This point leads into a third possible avenue for reform proposed by
Burrows for consideration, namely changing the threshold requirements for frustration of
contract. This issue also benefits from some insights from preliminary results from the
present empirical study.
3 Lowering the Threshold
Burrows suggests that a statutory criterion for frustration could be formulated in New
Zealand which would be easier to meet than that presently adopted.127 He notes that the
English law tradition continues to set a high threshold for relief under the doctrine.
124 Buxbaum, above n 122, 51-52.
125 Another interpretation of these results, now being explored in follow-up interviews, is that
respondents are calling for adjustment under insolvency law, rather than contract law. (011
possible overlaps between the two, see generally R Hillman "Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy
Discharge" (1990) 44 Stan L Rev 90. However, the point seems a fine one, and it has not yet
emerged in written comments to this question.
126 Above n 61, 291.
127 Above n 61, 287. Of course, the courts could also relax the preconditions, and it may prove
easier to do so in New Zealand than to adopt the other possible reforms discussed above.
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Elsewhere, Burrows has suggested that despite the potential for some relaxation opened up
by the High Court of Australia in 1985, for instance, this high threshold remains a feature of
both English and New Zealand law.128 This trend has continued into more recent times.129
Burrows suggests that part of the reason for this is the drastic solution, automatic total
discharge, which remains the only remedy.130
Burrows suggests that another reason is that English law quickly developed a strong
insistence on the absolute nature of contractual liability, and contrasts Continental systems
which have traditionally started with the notion of fault-based liability.131 Some doubts
have recently emerged as to precisely when this approach emerged in England,132 whereas
others have pointed out the increasingly strict nature of contractual obligation in civil law
jurisdications generally and in Japan in particular.133 Yet the point remains that civil law
jurisdictions do seem to set a somewhat lower threshhold in excusing performance.
Equally important is Burrows' point about US law. UCC §2-615 was enacted to
provide more scope for excuse, by deliberately moving away from traditional (and quite
precisely delineated) common law categories of "impossibility" towards a more general
standard of "impracticability". The latter was seen as less demanding.134 It should be added
that a more liberal standard was also perceived particularly by Karl Llewellyn, the
primary impetus behind the Code, as compatible with US business practices and
expectations at the time.135 Yet, as Burrows points out and more recent commentators
generally agree,136 changing the terminology has made little difference to court outcomes: US
courts remained quite reluctant to grant excuse. The same can be said of the development of
128 J Burrows, Update on Contract 1991 (NZLS Seminar, Wellington, 1991), 15: "even four swallows
[New Zealand cases where frustration was allowed] do not make a summer".
129 See eg The Super Servant Two [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1 (albeit more on issue of self-inducement of
contract); Power Co, above n 73.
130 Above n 61,277.
131 Above n 61, 277.
132 J Wladis "Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the Doctrine of
Impossibility of Performance in English Contract Law" (1987) 75 Geo L J 1575.
133 See, respectively, G Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1988) chl; and H Kubo above n 82,575-578.
134 Above n 61, 287.
135 Above n 61, 287-8287; J Wladis "Impracticability as Risk Allocation: The Effect of Changed
Circumstances upon Contract Obligations for the Sale of Goods" (1988) 22 Ga LR 503, 568-569.
136 Above n 135, 584 (although three counter-examples continue to surface: 588-589).
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the doctrine of changed circumstance in Japan.137 Only 24 of the 64 cases reported (as of
1994) clearly granted relief.138
Certainly, it is too much to expect that some particular wording can be devised that will
always adequately mark out the line between excuse and enforcement of performance -
even if one could agree where that line should be drawn.139 This has proven so with CISG,
where there are grave concerns as to whether different national courts will apply article 79
consistently, even though many of its concepts can be seen as reflecting a "common core" of
concepts found in many domestic legal systems.140 Interestingly, the UNIDROIT Principles
follow the wording of article 79 only in article 7, adding a further article 6 on "hardship"
(partially cited above) introducing concepts which are different again. As in other areas of
contract law, such as remoteness of damage, substantive considerations may be more
important in devising and implementing an appropriate test than agonising over the
phraseology used.141 The former approach can lead more naturally into more systematic
analysis of current contracting practices and expectations. If New Zealand lawmakers find
that approach appealing, preliminary responses of firms to the scenario set out in Part VI B
above also suggest that serious thought should be given to setting the threshold for relief so
that it is more readily passed in that or similar scenarios. However, as Burrows noted in
his earlier study, a lower threshhold may work more satisfactorily where the consequences
were less drastic, such as court power to vary the contract.142 Responses from New
137 Thus, the following comments (emphasis added) are quite incorrect if they imply that Japanese
courts more readily grant relief:
"Instead of trying to spell out all possible contingencies and provisions for enforcement in
inflexible terms, the Japanese prefer to handle problems as they arise, often recognizing the
doctrine Of changed circumstances" (March, above n 2,112).
"There was the added risk that the Japanese courts might refuse to enforce the Australian
judgment based on radically different low [favouring strict contractual liability] from that which the
Japanese courts recognize as applicable in the circumstances" (P Opas "What Happens when the
Contract becomes Unprofitable?" (1973) 1 ABLR 59, 62).
138 Above, n 91.
139 Ultimately, perhaps, "the wisdom of Solomon": A Corbin Corbin on Contracts (West, St Paul
Minn, 1962) 371-372. Cf P Wangerin, "The 'Wisdom of Solomon': Reliance, Unconscionability
and Excuse iii the Law of Contracts" (1992) 5 JCL 241.
140 H Smit "Frustration of Contact: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation" (1958) 58 Col L Rev
287, J B Marcantorio "Unifying the Law of Impossibility" (1984) 8 Hast Int & Comp L Rev 43.
141 Cf Cooke P in McElroy v Milne [1993] 1 NZLR 39 with R Ahdar "Remoteness, "Ritual
Incantation" and the Future of Hadley u Baxendale: Reflections from New Zealand" (1994) 7 JCL
53.
142 Above n 61, 288.
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Zealand firms (as well as US and particularly Japanese firms) indeed suggest that most
prefer relief by court adjustment, rather than outright excuse.
A specific aspect of the threshold test for frustration which deserves urgent
reconsideration is that of foreseeability. English caselaw has often required that the
supervening event not be foreseen or foreseeable. This also appeared to be a major reason
for the High Court's rather abrupt rejection of a claim of frustration in a recent case.143
Foreseeability of earthquakes in New Zealand was also a factor in disallowing frustration
in Hawkes Bay Electric Power Board v Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australia) Ltd.144 Yet
foreseeability per se has recently been criticised in England, New Zealand, the US and
Japan.145 A frequent criticism is that even if some events are actually foreseen, the parties
may have decided that the background legal principles would allow relief if they eventuated
anyway, and hence have not provided for such events in their contract document.
Disallowing relief on the ground that the event was reasonably foreseeable is also seen to
demand too much of the average contracting party and to lead courts, afforded the luxury of
hindsight, to increasingly circumscribe relief as evidence accumulates as to what extreme
changes have previously arisen to significantly derail contract performance.
Such doubts are supported to some extent by some responses already from Japanese
companies to a scenario similar to that set out in Part VI B above, but where the extreme
cost increase to the supplier is caused by a natural disaster like the Kobe earthquake of 17
February 1995, rather than purely economic disclocation caused by an oil embargo. One
respondent changed its preference from outright excuse to insistence that the supplier
perform the contract as originally agreed, if the natural disaster was "foreseeable". As the
survey was administered less than 18 months after this disastrous earthquake, this
response from a firm in the area affected may represent a tougher line; but it begs the
question of whether earthquakes are foreseeable or not. Further, three other respondents
(including two from the area affected) changed the prefered response from court adjustment
to outright excuse, despite the fact that the Kobe earthquake must have still weighed heavily
143 Gore District Council v Power Co Ltd [1996] 1 NZLR 58, 69. Cf the Court of Appeal's much more
extensive treatment (above n 73,26-33).
144 [1933] NZLR 873. Cf Burrows, above n 14, 637 (noting other factors which may have been more
decisive in that decision). The aftermath of the great Napier earthquake raise taiitalising
questions for further empirical research. For instance, virtually all survey plans and land title
certificates held by government departments and solicitors or banks were destroyed: R
McGregor The Great Quake (Regional Publications Ltd, Napier, 1989) 53.
145 J Mchinis "Frustration and· Force Majeure in Building Contracts" in E McKendrick (ed) Force
Majeure and Frustration of Contract (Lloyds, London, 1991) 151, 152-153 (but d A Phang
"Frustration in English Law - A Reappraisal" [1992] Anglo-Am LR 278, 289-294); Burrows, above
n 14, 637; Farnsworth, above n 75, 716-8; Kubo, above n 97.
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on their minds. Although these reactions are not so clear in preliminary responses from New
Zealand businesses, they do call into question a strict requirement of non-foreseeability in
this area of law.
VII FORM, SUBSTANCE, AND NEO-PROCEDURALISM
An interest in actual practices and expectations of contracting parties underlies the
approach towards New Zealand's contract law adopted by both Burrows and Barton.
More recently, McLauchlan has also argued that the courts do strive to recognise those
expectations, provided they are "reasonable".146 Overall, the argument often appears to be
that if there is a "gap" between contract practice and contract law, both the courts and the
legislature should try to narrow it. This Part concludes by sketching some implications of
that approach.
The "form-substance" distinction developed by Patrick Atiyah and Robert Summers can
be usefully extended to compare contract law and legal institutions in New Zealand and
Japan, as well as England and the US.147 Courts and legislative bodies in legal systems more
open to substantive reasoning - involving "moral, economic, political, institutional or
social considerations"148 - will be more likely to attempt to stay in tune with the actual
practices and expectations of contracting parties. Their counterparts in more formal systems
may still attempt to reduce gaps, but rather by encouraging or indeed forcing practices and
expectations to conform to the dictates of the law. The US and Japan appear to more
consistently adopt the former stance.149 From time to time, English and New Zealand judges
also insist that they aim to decide cases in accordance with community practices and
expectations.150 However the overall impression is of a more formal approach to contract
law adjudication.151
146 D McLauchlan "The 'New' Law of Contract in New Zealand" [1992] NZ Recent L Rev 436.
147 Nottage, above n 85.
148 P S Atiyah and R S Summers Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study of
Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987) 15.
149 See eg Llewellyn's efforts in the middle of this century to codify sales law in the UCC (above n
135),and Trakman (above n 30) 33-37. It also drives the current review of Article 2 (Preliminary
Report, 1991 (above n 12). Uchida's analysis (above n 13, 99) suggests that this tendency also
characterises contemporary Japanese contract case law. See also V L Taylor "Continuing
Transactions and Persistent Myths: Contracts in Contemporary Japan" (1993) 19 Melbourne
University Law Review 352. But cf Nottage, above n 52.
150 Eg P Devlin "The Relation between Commercial Law and Commercial Practice" (1951) 14 MLR
249,266.
151 J Bell Policy Arguments in judicial Decisions (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983) 244-245 concludes
that the "interstitial legislator" model better characterises the approach of English judges. Cases
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The pervasiveness of these tendencies remains to be more fully explored.152 However, if
Atiyah and Summers' message of deep-rooted systematic differences between legal systems
can be extended to New Zealand in this way, then it also raises difficult questions of
general legal theory. The increasing complexity of contemporary society raises grave doubts
as to the ability of formal reasoning to order social relations, and even as to its foundation
in traditional liberal philosophy. Recent empirical studies into actual practices and
expectations in certain contracting situations raise difficult substantive arguments as to
whether those should be simply absorbed into the law or kept separate to promote values
such as efficiency or party autonomy.153 Some argue that substantive reasoning driven by
an instrumentalist philosophy is no longer feasible or normatively tenable. The way
forward seems to be "neo-procedural" visions of law, which focus on processes involved in
interactions between increasingly differentiated social sub-systems, including the legal
system; between people in webs of relations coming to terms with the normative force of
positive law; or between people constrained by patterns of argumentation.154 The
possibility of shedding some new light on these debates in a New Zealand context further
underpins the ongoing empirical research introduced in this article.
such as McCutcheon v McBrayne [1964] 2 All ER 430,438-439 (per Lord Devlin) then show how
narrow the interstice for judicial creativity can be. On conflicting directions in New Zealand
appellate courts, see generally J Smillie, above n 112. For recent critiques of predominantly
formal reasoning in New Zealand contract cases, see D McLauchlan "The Plain Meaning Rule
of Contract Interpretation" (1996) 2 NZBLQ 80, and "Subsequent Conduct as an Aid to
Interpretation" (1996) 2 NZBLQ 237.
152 Practitioners' views on the present state of contract law, and its prefered state (likely to bear
some relation to contract practices), could also be systematically ascertained. Cf J Gava and P
Kincaid "Contract and Conventionalism: Professional Attitudes to Changes in Contract Law in
Australia" (1996) 10 JCL 141.
153 See eg the summary of some of the divergent views at a symposium on "Law, Economics and
Norms": R Pildes "The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law" (1996) 144 U Pa L Rev 2055,
2055-2056.
154 See, respectively, G Teubner "Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law" (1983) 17
Law and Society Review 240; T Tanase "Ho no Imiryokai to Community [Community and
Understanding Meaning in Law]" in T Tanase (ed) Gendai no Fuhokoiho [Modern Tort Law] 291
(Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1994); K Yamamoto "Keiyaku to Kosho [Contract and Negotiation]" in
S.Tanaka (ed) Gendai Riron Hogaku Nyumon [Introduction to Modern Legal Theory] 48 (Horitsu
Bunkasha, Tokyo, 1993).
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